Establishing a Value Chain for Human Factors in Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Modernization  by Joe, Jeffrey C. et al.
2351-9789 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference
doi: 10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.281 
 Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1312 – 1318 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
ScienceDirect
6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2015) and the 
Affiliated Conferences, AHFE 2015
Establishing a value chain for human factors in nuclear power plant
control room modernization
Jeffrey C. Joe*, Kenneth D. Thomas, Ronald L. Boring
Idaho National Laboratory, PO Box 1625, Mail Stop 3818, Idaho Falls 83402, USA
Abstract
Commercial nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) have operated reliably and efficiently for decades. Witha second 20-
year life extensionof operation beyond the plant’s original operating licenses now being considered by many utilities, there are 
opportunities to achieve even greater efficiencies,while maintaining high operational reliabilities, through strategic, risk- and 
economically-informed, upgrades to plant systems and infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor
Sustainability (LWRS) program supports the commercial nuclear industry’s modernization efforts through research and
development (R&D) activities acrossmany areas to help establish the technical and economic bases for modernization activities. 
The Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems Technologies pathway is one R&D focus area for the LWRS
program, and has researchers at Idaho National Laboratory working with select utility partners to use human factors and 
instrumentation and controls R&D to help modernize the plant’s main control room. However, some in the nuclear industry have
not been as enthusiastic about using human factors R&D to inform life extension decision-making. Part of the reason for this may 
stem from uncertainty decision-makers have regarding how human factors fits into the value chain for nuclear power plant 
control room modernization. This paper reviews past work that has attempted to demonstrate the value of human factors, and 
then describes the value chain concept, how it applies to control room modernization, and then makes a case for how and why 
human factors is an essential link in the modernization value chain.
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1. Introduction
Affordable electricity generation is an essential component to powering a nation’s robust and globally 
competitive economy. In the United States (U.S.), nuclear power accounts for approximately 20% of current base 
load electricity generation, and does so without the release of carbon into the atmosphere [1]. Low carbon 
replacement technologies that provide base load electricity cost competitively at a national scale are still under 
development. Thus, without suitable replacements for nuclear power, the generating capability of nuclear power in 
the U.S. must be maintained through the continued safe and efficient operation of the current fleet of nuclear power 
plants (NPPs).
The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is a research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The LWRS program is operated in close 
collaboration with industry research and development (R&D) programs to provide the technical foundations for 
licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of NPPs that are currently in operation. In 
short, the LWRS program focuses on research that contributes to the national policy objectives of energy security 
and economic sustainability.
One focus area in the LWRS program is the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems 
Technologies pathway, which includes human factors R&D on main control room modernization.However, some in
the nuclear industry have not beenenthusiastic about using human factors R&D to inform life extension decision-
making. A survey of 11 U.S. utilities conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL)[2] revealed that there is a 
unique situation for control room upgrades: while there is desire to upgrade, practical constraints such as cost 
(primarily through lost revenue) are a formidable hurdle to the upgrade process. Thus, part of the reason for this lack 
of enthusiasm may stem from uncertainty decision-makers have regarding how human factors fits into the value 
chain for NPP control room modernization. That is, given the focus on costs and return on investment (ROI), and 
because it can be difficult to see how focusing on human factors helps address costs and ROI, it is understandable to 
see decision makers discount the importance ofconducting R&D to address human factors issues. It is our assertion, 
however, that human factors is an essential link in the modernization value chain. This paper reviews past work that 
has attempted to demonstrate the value of human factors, and then describes the value chain concept, how it applies 
to control room modernization, and then makes a case for how and why human factors is an essential link in the 
modernization value chain.
2. The value of human factors
The need to demonstrate the important role human factors plays in the engineering of technological solutions is 
not new. Howell [3]provides an anecdote from when he was the chief scientist for research on human systems for 
the U.S. Air Force. He described his experience of receiving, at best, grudging acceptance and tolerance for human 
factors from some military decision makers, despite presenting to them what he considered very compelling 
technical and economic evidence. Thus, in many ways, this issue of how these technologies benefit the commercial 
nuclear industry is essentially the larger question of how human factors, as a professional discipline, adds value to 
the design, development, testing, and implementation of new complex technologies, and how technologies that have 
been “human factored” add value to the overall socio-technological system that has been engineered to solve a 
particular problem. This value proposition question has been studied extensively in the field of human factors, 
particularly for usability[4], and cognitive modeling[5]. There also are a number of military case studies that are 
either 1) cautionary tales showing the undesired outcomes when human factors are not considered, or 2) provide 
confirmatory evidence that human factors improves important performance and safety outcomes while minimizing 
training needs, and costs to build, deploy, and maintain these technologies.
Among the cautionary tales, Cockshell and Hanna [6] and Sutherland et al. [7] reported the command center 
aboard the Anzac class frigate used by the Australian and New Zealand Navies did not include human factors in its 
design. As a result, the frigate encountered a variety of problems as it was being put into service. Operationally, 
there were numerous space constraint issues in the command center, and the crew had additional issues with some 
controls being difficult to reach. Crews also had difficulty with the HSI in that critical information was often not 
properly displayed, which greatly affected their situation awareness during time-critical tasks. A number of 
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workarounds were developed, but they were all reported as being less than optimal. Furthermore, the estimated cost 
to redesign the command center was so high that changes to the command center were delayed until a ship-wide 
retrofit was deemed necessary to maintain the ship’s war fighting capability.
Another example is from Hawley [8], which assessed the Patriot air and missile defense system. This systemhad 
been used reliably and safely for years, butwas more recently involved in two fratricides during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF). Hawley’s assessment noted that the Patriot system had been upgraded prior to OIF with more 
automation to defend against newer air threats (e.g., Tactical ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles), but 
that there were issues with the automation’s ability to correctly identify whether the now wider range of targets were 
friendly or hostile. Hawley’s report suggests that the automation designers did not effectively communicate these 
deficiencies to the operators. Furthermore, the HSI was not significantly improved when the automation was added, 
nor was the operator’s training or role re-evaluated. The result was that the operator was often over-reliant on the 
automation, resulting in the operator losing situation awareness, and failing to have a questioning attitude towards 
the automation’s decisions to engage incoming targets.
Some notable confirmatory examples include the U.S. Army’s Fox M93A1 reconnaissance vehicle. The Fox 
vehicle is essentially a mobile laboratory that analyzes air, water, and ground samples for nuclear, biological, and 
chemical threats. When the Army decided to reduce the crew compliment from 4 to 3 soldiers, a human factors 
redesign was needed on both 1) the crew cabin and workstation controls, and 2) the conduct of operations, such that 
the roles and responsibilities could be reassigned. Booher and Minninger[9] analyzed the effect the human factors 
involvement had in this redesign and found thatthe human factors subject matter expertise on how to reallocate tasks 
to address excessive workload and the use of human figure modeling tools were essential to the successful redesign 
of the Fox vehicle. In fact, Burgess-Limerick, Cotea, and Pietrzak[10] report that the return on investment to cost 
ratio for the human factors involvement was around 30:1.
Booher and Minniger[9] also analyzed how human factors involvement in the redesign of the Apache Longbow 
helicopter led to a 20:1 ROI to costs ratio. Specifically, the original design and location of some cockpit controls 
interfered with the proper functioning of a key safety system, and human factors experts were centrally involved in 
the redesign of those controls. Additionally, it was found that many aspects of the Apache’s original design often 
complicated maintenance activities. For example, the design of some compartments made it difficult for 
maintenance personnel to access recessed components, and maintenance personnel would often inadvertently 
damage sensitive components by stepping or standing on the housing for those components while performing repairs 
on other parts because the original design of the helicopter’s fuselage provided no footholds. Human factors reviews 
and analyses of these problems played an important role in coming up with cost effective solutions.
These studies, and many others (for a review, see [10]), have led many in the armed services, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and academia [11] to
conclude that the cost of integrating human factors into the R&D of military and other technologies[4][5]is a 
worthwhile investment in terms of cost savings, increased productivity, decreased training needs, and decreased 
errors when using the “human factored” system. According to the U.S.Air Force[12] the human factors R&D costs 
are typically only 2-4.2% of the total R&D or system acquisition cost, and a frequently cited statisticin this literature 
is that the return on investment for human factors in military applications is typically 40-60 times the original 
investment.
These statistics are quite impressive, yet the methodology of the studies cited in this section provides only 
anecdotal evidence regarding the efficacy of human factors, which some researchers mentioned above recognize that 
others may dispute [10]. Be that as it may, it cannot be disputed that in warfare, end-users of military technologies 
need those technologies to work as expected when deployed in field, and especially when used during engagements. 
Both military leaders and designers of these technologies are keenly aware of this. It is safe to say that no military 
leader wants to put their subordinates, particularly those who are at the “point of the spear,” into harm’s way with 
military technologies that do not work. This in itself is an important reason why the armed services, and other high-
risk industries, invest as much as they do in human factors. The possible negative consequences, from the loss of 
lives in the field, losing the battle, and the end of the leader’s military career for failing to accomplish the mission 
objectives are significant. It is apparent, based on how much the military invests in human factors, that military 
leaders generally agree that these negative consequences should not hinge on poorly designed technologies.
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This reason aside, it is nevertheless challenging to take the anecdotal evidence presented in thesemilitary human 
factors examples and apply them directly to modernization activities in the commercial nuclear industry.In light of 
this, we posit that LWRShuman factors R&D needs to formulate more explicitly the value chain to demonstrate how 
these technologies benefit the commercial nuclear industry.
3. The value chain for human factors and advanced control room technologies
Rouse and Boff[13] describe the value chain as a valuable construct to help understand how to tie initial costs to 
the expected return on investments. They write, “More specifically, it is quite helpful to consider the value chain 
from investments (or costs), to products, to benefits, to stakeholders, to utility of benefits, to willingness to pay, and 
finally to returns on investments” (pg. 641). In translating this generic value chain and applying it to this research 
problem, the value chain becomes the following questions:
1. What can operators do with this new technology that they could not do before? That is, by investing in these 
products, what are the expected technical benefits to operators and the plant?
2. What would that result in in terms of plant outcomes?
3. How would this show up in business or key performance indicators (KPIs)?
With respect to the first question, there is a range of technical benefits to the operators with the introduction of 
new control room technologies. Examples of new control room technologies includes digital control systems, new 
alarm systems, advanced digital displays for the plant process computer, and computer based procedures. The first 
obvious benefit to introducing and using these kinds of new technologies is the reduction in operator workload and 
mental burden. In NPP control rooms, the highest mental burden on the operators is typically during most critical 
situations, and these technologies have the ability to reduce workload during these critical situations. The inclusion 
of technologies that automate routine activities also benefits operators. Automating routine sequences of activities 
eliminates tedious, switch-by-switch control the operators currently perform, which then allows them to command 
the plant at a higher level rather than being weighed down in the tedium of getting systems aligned. Another 
technical benefit of these technologies is that they can help the operator integrate plant information when diagnosing 
plant conditions. This is particularly useful when the plant is experiencing abnormal and/or emergency conditions. 
These technologies can also provide trending information on key plant parameters that can provide advanced 
notification to the operator, prior to any alarm setpoint, thereby assisting operators with their task of diagnosing 
plant conditions. Similarly these trends can be used to forecast the future state of the plant (via extrapolation of past 
and current plant conditions), providing additional time for the operator to address issues. It is also possible to 
extrapolate past and current sensor data, based on system models and energy balances, to create additional “virtual” 
sensors that further enhance the operator’s understanding of plant conditions. In terms of improving the conduct of 
operations, the introduction of technologies that improve procedure implementation can provide numerous technical 
benefits, such as ensuring that operators correctly transition from different plant procedures based on plant 
conditions by validating the entry conditions, and automatically presenting the correct procedures to the operator. 
These technologies can also improve the communication interface between control room operators, plant support 
(i.e., field operators), and management systems. Finally, all of these technologies are designed with the philosophy 
of providing richer information in a more intuitive manner that improves the operator’s comprehension of changing 
plant conditions.
With respect to the second question in our value chain (i.e., What would that result in in terms of plant 
outcomes?), the technical benefits described above would result in fewer safety challenges to the plant due to 
operators failing to detect and correctly diagnose off-normal conditions. That is, operators would be able to more 
quickly respond to plant transients, thereby minimizing the severity of the plant’s deviations from normal operating 
parameters. The inclusion of these advanced monitoring and diagnosis technologies allows operators to focus on 
other ancillary duties with less concern that they are not maintaining adequate vigilance over the plant’s state, and 
could lead to some reduction in the number of operations support staff (i.e., field operators). These control room 
technologies can also provide indications of the plant’s state to field operators and other support staff outside of the 
control room, thereby facilitating the dissemination of information to key support personnel without burdening 
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control room operators with the task of communicating this information. Overall, these technologies will result in 
fewer time-critical actions by both control and field operators.
The results mentioned previously would manifest themselves in business or KPIs. There are a number of industry 
standard KPIs that would be affected by the aforementioned technological enhancements, including a higher 
capacity factor, reduced forced loss rate, reduced organizational and management (O&M) costs, reduced radiation 
exposure to plant staff, and improved ratings from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Institute for 
Nuclear Power Operations. Figure1 summarizes the value chain presented for advanced control room technologies.
Fig. 1.The value chain for advanced control room technologies.
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4. Signs of progress
Two examples within the commercial nuclear energy domain provide some preliminary indication that the 
nuclear industry and human factors professionals in nuclear energy are starting to integrate this value chain 
paradigm into their R&D activities. The first example is from research INL is conducting with a utility partner to 
improve the management of NPP refueling outages[14]. The utility used new “human factored” technologies to 
improve organization and information sharing during one of their outages, and as a result, realized significant 
increases in productivity and reduced costs, primarily through avoiding the expenditure of additional weeks of time 
in outage.
The second example is from control room modernization research INL is performing in collaboration with a 
utility partner[15]. The utility partner is currently performing an upgrade to three of their NPP’s turbine control 
systems (TCS). In reviewing and testing the design of the new digital TCS at INL for one of the NPPs, the utility’s 
operators discovered through a knowledge elicitation process that repetitive manual control actions associated with 
increasing and decreasing turbine speed during startup were automated with the new TCS, thereby reducing the 
tedium of the activity and its associated human error potential. The expectation is that this human factors 
improvement in the design of the new TCS will lead to broader improvements in operations performance, and 
ultimately, improved KPIs for the plant.
5. Conclusion
These two examples aside, the field of human factors generally needs to demonstrate its value to complex, socio-
technical applied engineering projects more effectively. Anecdotal evidence [10] and accident investigation 
reportsidentifying human errors as root causes only go so far in convincing decision makers how much human 
factors adds value to these kinds of engineering problems. Even arguments that human factors R&D needs to be
more scientifically rigorous and generate objective empirical evidence (i.e., be value neutral) may notbe the silver 
bullet thatit was once thought to be.Human factors needs to conduct empirically rigorous R&D, but within the 
context of the decision makers’ value chain. Doing so provides a clearer roadmap for how human factors R&D can 
achieve greater success in its ultimate implementation in projects that are solving complex, socio-technical applied 
engineering problems.
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